




Minimal Overlap Rules for Bankruptcy
Hendrickx, R.L.P.; Borm, P.E.M.; Elk, R.; Quant, M.
Publication date:
2005
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Hendrickx, R. L. P., Borm, P. E. M., Elk, R., & Quant, M. (2005). Minimal Overlap Rules for Bankruptcy. (CentER
Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-87). Microeconomics.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.






















MINIMAL OVERLAP RULES FOR BANKRUPTCY 
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Abstract
This paper introduces a new way of representing bankruptcy rules. These
representations are used to show that the minimal overlap rule is a composi-
tion of the Ibn Ezra rule and the constrained equal losses rule. The residual
minimal overlap rule is analysed as an alternative extension of the Ibn Ezra
rule, by using a composition with the constrained equal awards rule.
Key words: bankruptcy, representations, Ibn Ezra rule, minimal overlap rule,
residual minimal overlap rule, duality
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1 Introduction
The seminal paper by O’Neill (1982) on bankruptcy problems starts with a dis-
cussion on a solution proposed by the Talmudic scholar Ibn Ezra. This rule has a
natural interpretation in terms of players putting their claims on specific parts of
the available estate. One drawback of this rule, however, is that it is only defined
for situations in which the estate does not exceed the largest claim.
O’Neill (1982) extends Ibn Ezra’s rule to the class of all bankruptcy situations,
the result of which Thomson (2003) calls the minimal overlap rule. Its definition,
though natural, is rather implicit and no explicit formula for this rule exists. Hence,
very little is known about this rule.
This paper presents a new look on the Ibn Ezra rule and the minimal overlap
rule. We first provide an insightful pictorial way of representing bankruptcy rules
in terms of partial derivatives with respect to the estate. With the help of these
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representations, we can decompose the minimal overlap rule into two parts: for an
estate smaller than the largest claim, it coincides with the Ibn Ezra rule and for
larger estates, it equals the Ibn Ezra rule on part of the estate (the largest claim)
plus the constrained equal losses rule on the residual claims and estate.
One obvious question arising from this decomposition is what happens if on the
residual part we apply the constrained equal awards rule rather than the constrained
equal losses rule. We provide an interpretation of this rule, which we call the residual
minimal overlap rule, in terms of putting claims on specific parts of the estate. This
interpretation turns out to have a dual flavour to the idea behind minimal overlap.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we consider
alternative representations of bankruptcy rules. In Section 3, we consider the min-
imal overlap rule and show that it can be decomposed into an Ibn Ezra part and
a constrained equal losses part. The residual minimal overlap rule is the topic of
Section 4.
2 Bankruptcy rules and representations
A bankruptcy situation (cf. O’Neill (1982)) is a triple (N,E, c), where N =
{1, . . . , n} is the set of players, E ≥ 0 is the estate to be divided and c ∈ RN+
is the vector of claims such that
∑
i∈N ci ≥ E. Throughout the paper we assume
that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn and the total of claims is denoted by C =
∑
i∈N ci. The
class of bankruptcy situations with player set N is denoted by BRN .
A bankruptcy rule is a function ϕ : BRN → RN that assigns to each bank-
ruptcy situation (N,E, c) ∈ BRN a payoff vector ϕ(N, E, c) ∈ RN such that
0 ≤ ϕ(N, E, c) ≤ c (reasonability) and ∑i∈N ϕi(N, E, c) = E (efficiency). In this
paper, we only study bankruptcy rules for fixed N .
We further assume that bankruptcy rules are continuous and componentwise
(weakly) increasing in E, which holds for almost all rules that are known in the
literature. We study the shapes of the payoffs ϕi as function of E, for a fixed claim
vector c. A representation of ϕ is a vector of functions fϕ,c = (fϕ,ci )i∈N , where for
all i ∈ N , fϕ,ci : [0, C] → R is such that




for all E ∈ [0, C]. Given our assumptions, ϕi is differentiable almost everywhere
(a.e.). Therefore, a representation always exists. Furthermore, it is uniquely defined
2
and nonnegative a.e. Also, because ϕ is efficient, we have that for all x ∈ [0, C],∑
i∈N f
ϕ,c
i (x) = 1 a.e.
The proportional rule is defined by PROPi(N,E, c) =
ci
C
E for all i ∈ N . A
representation for n = 3 is depicted in Figure 1. For each i ∈ N , fPROP,ci is a
















Before showing representations of some other bankruptcy rules, we first consider
duality. The dual ϕ̄ of a bankruptcy rule ϕ (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)) is
defined by ϕ̄(N,E, c) = c − ϕ(N, C − E, c) for all (N, E, c) ∈ BRN . Define for
each representation fϕ,c a dual representation f̄ϕ,c by f̄ϕ,ci (x) = f
ϕ,c
i (C − x) for all




Proposition 2.1 If fϕ,c is a representation for ϕ, then f̄ϕ,c is a representation for
ϕ̄.
Proof: Let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule, let c be a claims vector and let fϕ,c be a














= ϕi(N,C, c)− ϕi(N,C − E, c)




As a result of the previous proposition, a bankruptcy rule ϕ is self-dual (ϕ = ϕ̄) if
and only if fϕ,c = f̄ϕ,c a.e. for every claims vector c.
The constrained equal awards rule is defined by CEAi(N, E, c) = min{ci, α},
where α is such that
∑
i∈N CEAi(N, E, c) = E. Its dual is the constrained equal
losses rule, defined by CELi(N, E, c) = max{ci−β, 0}, where β is again determined
by efficiency. Representations of these dual rules are depicted for n = 4 in Figure 2.
Again, we indicate on each line segment the players involved. Where a player is
absent, the value of his representation function is 0. We abbreviate d1 = c1+c2+2c3.
Note that in view of Proposition 2.1, the representations of CEA and CEL are

































Figure 2: fCEA,c and fCEL,c
The Talmud rule (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)) is defined by




c) if E ≥ 1
2
C,
c− CEA(N,C − E, 1
2
c) if E < 1
2
C.
This rule is self-dual and combines the ideas of constrained equal awards and con-
strained equal losses. A representation for n = 4 is depicted in Figure 3. Note that
since TAL is self-dual, the graph is symmetric in the line x = 1
2
C.1
1From the examples in this section, one might think that all well-known bankruptcy rules are
piecewise linear in the estate. Curiel (1988), however, shows that the adjusted proportional rule is




















3 The minimal overlap rule
The first bankruptcy rule mentioned by O’Neill (1982) is Ibn Ezra’s solution, named
after a Talmudic scholar from the 12th century. This rule, IE, is only defined for
E ≤ cn and draws on the idea that each player has a claim on a specific part of the
estate. O’Neill uses the example with E = 120 and c = (30, 40, 60, 120). Player 1
claims 30, but this 30 is claimed by all four players, so player 1 should receive only
a quarter of his claim. Player 2 should receive his part of the 30 plus a third of his
residual claim of 10, and so on.
Ibn Ezra’s method is illustrated in Figure 4. Each player has a claim on a specific
part of the estate, represented by line segments, and these claims are nested. Each
part of the estate is divided equally among the players having a claim on it. The


















Figure 4: IE(N, 120, (30, 40, 60, 120))
Because Ibn Ezra’s method can only be applied if the estate does not exceed the
largest claim (otherwise part of the estate would remain unclaimed), a representation
only exists on [0, c4]. Claims that are larger than the estate are simply truncated so



















Figure 5: f IE,c
There are of course various ways to extend the IE rule to the full domain of
estates. O’Neill (1982) presents one natural extension, which is based on a property
he calls “lexicographic minimisation of conflict by extent”. The players’ claims
(again, truncated to the estate) are arranged such that the size of the part of the
estate claimed by exactly one player is maximal, and given this, the size of the part
of the estate claimed by two players is maximal, and so on. Obviously, if E does not
exceed the largest claim, then this boils down to Ibn Ezra’s method. O’Neill names
the resulting rule, which he proves to be uniquely determined by this property, the
extended Ibn Ezra rule. We follow Thomson (2003) in calling it the minimal overlap
rule, MO.
As a consequence of lexicographic minimisation of conflict by extent, the first t
units of each claim are overlapping, while the residual claims are put disjointly on
the estate. So, to compute the MO solution, which will be illustrated in the next
example, we have to find a t such that
g(t) = E, (3.1)




(ci − t)+ + t
for all t ∈ R. The solution of (3.1) is unique, except when cn−1 < E ≤ cn, in which
case we take t = E.
Example 3.1 Consider N = {1, . . . , 4}, E = 10 and c = (2, 3, 6, 8). Then t = 4.












Figure 6: MO(N, 10, (2, 3, 6, 8))
The payoff to player 1 equals 1
2











+ 2 = 31
3
and the remaining 51
3
is for player 4. /
In order to give a representation for MO, we need to know more about the t defined
by (3.1). If E ≤ cn, then it follows immediately from claims truncation that t = E.
For E > cn, t is computed by applying the inverse function of g to E. For four
players, the piecewise linear function g is depicted in Figure 7, as well as the solution




















































Figure 7: Determining t for MO
Using the construction of t in Figure 7, we can now find a representation of the
MO rule. If the estate does not exceed the largest claim, the MO rule coincides
with the IE rule and hence, their representations coincide. If E increases from c4 to
d1, then t goes down from c3 to c2. So on this interval, the overlapping parts of the
claims of players 3 and 4 decrease (at the same speed), while for the other players





for all x ∈ [c4, d1]. Similarly,
7
players 2, 3 and 4 receive an equal share when the estate increases from d1 to d2,



















of the MO rule with those of the IE rule and CEL rule, we arrive at the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Let (N, E, c) ∈ BRN . Then
MO(N, E, c) =
{
IE(N, E, c) if E ≤ cn,
IE(N, cn, c) + CEL(N,E − cn, c′) if E > cn,
where c′ = c− IE(N, cn, c).
Proof: If E ≤ cn, then the assertion immediately follows from the construction of
the MO rule. If E > cn, then IEn(N, cn, c) − IEn−1(N, cn, c) = cn − cn−1. Hence,
c′n = c
′
n−1. (Note also that c
′
1 ≤ c′2 ≤ . . . ≤ c′n−1.) Because the two largest residual
claims are equal, applying CEL to (N,E − cn, c′) results in the representation of
Figure 2, without the separate segment for player n. So, fMO,c
′
on [cn, C] boils down
to fCEL,c
′
on [0, C − cn]. From this, the statement readily follows. ¤
4 The residual minimal overlap rule
One natural question arising from Theorem 3.1 is what happens if we use the CEA
rule rather than the CEL rule to extend the IE rule. Put differently, how can we
interpret the rule whose representation is given in Figure 9, and which for reasons
that will become clear later on we call the residual minimal overlap rule (RMO),


















We first provide a definition of the RMO rule and later on we show that it indeed
has a representation as depicted in Figure 9.
For MO, the claims are put in such a way as to minimise total overlap, while
putting the smallest claims in this overlapping part. For RMO, we also minimise
total minimal overlap, but now the smallest claims are not situated in the overlap-
ping part. Rather, the disjoint part of the claim has the same size for all players
(with of course the restriction that this should not exceed the claim itself), while
the residual claims overlap.
Taking t to be the (maximal) size of the disjoint part of a claim, the size of the
overlapping part equals cn − t. Hence, we have to find a t such that
h(t) = E, (4.1)




min{t, ci}+ cn − t
for all t ∈ R. This t is unique except when E = C, in which case we take t = cn−1.
Example 4.1 Consider N = {1, . . . , 4}, E = 15 and c = (2, 3, 6, 8). Then t = 21
2
.
The arrangement of the claims is depicted in Figure 10.













and the remaining 61
6
is for player 4.
Note that for the bankruptcy situation (N, E, c) described in Example 3.1, we
have t = 2
3


























E + t− c4 = 912
Figure 10: RMO(N, 15, (2, 3, 6, 8))
Again, it is readly seen that if the estate is smaller than the largest claim, the RMO
solution and the IE solution coincide.
Figure 11 depicts the graph of h(t), as well as the solution of (4.1). For E ≤ c4,
it follows from claims truncation that t = 0 is the solution of (4.1). For c4 < E < C,
the solution is given by the inverse function of h, while for E = C, t = c3 is taken








































Figure 11: Determining t for RMO
Obviously, fRMO,c and f IE,c coincide on [0, c4]. If E goes from c4 to d1, t increases






all i ∈ N and x ∈ [c4, d1]. The remainder of the representation in Figure 9 follows
similarly.
The following theorem follows in the same way as Theorem 3.1.




IE(N,E, c) if E ≤ cn,
IE(N, cn, c) + CEA(N, E − cn, c′) if E > cn,
where c′ = c− IE(N, cn, c).
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